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SUBJECT: SOMALIA - AMISOM COMMANDER COMMENTS ON TFG SECURITY SECTOR

Summary

11. (SBU) Summary: On November 6 the Africa Mission to Somalia's (AMISOM) new Deputy Force Commander detailed AMISOM's recent support to the TFG's effort to stand up a national army. He said the TFG lacks the capacity and funds to sufficiently house, feed, water, equip and pay newly trained and formed army units. Future iterations of TFG troop training will need to be supported by AMISOM and international contributions. He said both the TFG's civilian and military leadership suffers from lack of capacity and poor coordination. End Summary.

AMISOM Helping Re-Integrate Troops

12. (SBU) On November 6 we met with Burundian Major General Hakiza Cyprien, Deputy Force Commander (DFC) of the Africa Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Joining us was Patrick Geysen, EU representative to the Security Sector Assessment. This was our first meeting with the DFC, who replaced DFC Juvenal, killed on September 17 by a suicide bomber. We found General Cyprien very professional and open.

13. (SBU) The DFC said he was assisting the TFG to integrate a group of Siad Barre-era former soldiers and newly-trained soldiers just back from Djibouti. In the General's opinion the Siad Barre-era soldiers need refresher training because they have not been operating as part of a military force for almost 20 years now. As they have remained in Somalia since the fall of the old regime they have no idea how things are done outside of the country, he said. He said that AMISOM could provide modern military refresher training to these former soldiers. At the TFG's request, AMISOM will help merge these mature troops with those trained in Djibouti. The TFG has had success mixing older soldiers with younger ones; Defense minister Abdullah Boss credits this formula with preserving the cohesion of 1,750 TFG troops recruited in February from former ARS militias. (Comment: Lending credence to this claim, we have seen salary receipts that indicate that the vast majority of former-ARS militias were present for a recent Italian-funded, AMISOM-administered salary payment. End Comment.)

Somali Forces Lack Clan Diversity...

14. (SBU) Turning to the troops trained in Djibouti, the DFC was concerned that they lacked clan diversity, as did the TFG military force as a whole. In the DFC's opinion, not only must the government recruit from all clans, but future training must diminish the recruits' clan identities. The recruits who were trained in Djibouti are being housed in the former Air Force HQ area for at

least a month for reintegration training, the DFC said.

...Equipment, Leadership...

¶5. (SBU) There were problems with the Djibouti-trained troops' reintegration. According to the DFC, the TFG had no credible plan in place to house and feed the newly-returned troops. AMISOM was forced to supply food and tents. They did not receive full uniforms from the TFG until October 5, when Yemeni-supplied uniforms arrived. Though the TFG assigned an officer to command them, there are few, if any, NCOs, company-grade, or field-grade officers assigned to them. As part of the merger of the Siad Barre-era soldiers and the Djibouti-trained troops, AMISOM is also issuing identification cards to them.

...and Salaries

¶6. (SBU) The TFG lacked the planning capacity and funding to respond to the troops' needs, the DFC said. For example, he estimates at least one-third of the first tranche of recruits who were trained in Uganda have by now deserted due to lack of salaries, supplies, housing and leadership. Some may have even defected to al-Shabaab, the DFC feared. The TFG, AMISOM and international donors must support the next groups of recruits who return from training in Uganda or else they too might disappear in large numbers.

¶7. (SBU) Continuing on the topic of salaries, the DFC said the Italian government funded, and AMISOM administered, salary payments

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to 1,750 TFG troops recruited in February from former ARS militias, as well as to the remnants of the Uganda-trained troops. But after paying September's salary, Defense Minister Abdullah Boss halted the October payments before they were completed, the DFC said. (Note: According to Defense Minister Boss, he was compelled to stop the payments or risk a mutiny by other unpaid troops, notably the Ethiopian-trained soldiers still supporting the TFG. End note.) Nonetheless, the payment system, which required personal appearances by the troops before a board of TFG government and AMISOM administrators, seemed to have worked well, the DFC said.

¶8. (SBU) The General reaffirmed AMISOM's commitment to provide a one-month induction process for new recruits, and a further one-month reintegration period for up to 900 returning recruits at a time. However, he said AMISOM will need some help from donors to provide food, shelter and stipends for these recruits. He insisted that future induction and reintegration programs include NCOs and officers in order to enhance unit cohesiveness, command and control.

AMISOM Stepping Up PD Efforts

¶9. (SBU) The DFC commented that the new "Radio AMISOM" will help improve the local community's perception of AMISOM. He says that currently there are numerous anti-government and anti-AMISOM transmitters that extol the virtues of al-Shabaab and criticize AMISOM.

¶10. (SBU) In closing he commented that the problem with Mogadishu as well as South Central Somalia is not the army but the TFG itself. He said that the government is not moving in one direction, but instead is moving in many different directions in a much uncoordinated manner to the detriment of the country.

Comment

¶11. (SBU) Comment: The DFC's observations highlight the lack of capacity of the TFG's security sector leadership. They also underscore the effect that the TFG's apparent lack of resources has on its troops' morale. Many countries are volunteering to train TFG troops, but supporting them once they return to Somalia will require

international contributions of housing, food, water and regular salaries if TFG soldiers will be expected to stay on the job and perform.

RANNEBERGER